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Andrea MacGregor* 	 Conflicts	of	Interest	in	Self-Regulating
	 Health	Professions	Regulators
This article analyzes a set of related complaints and informal reports made to 
the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors with respect to an alleged breach of 
the College’s advertising policy. This analysis assessed situational elements of 
conflicts of interest in the complaint process, particularly dual roles and competing 
professional interests, against the Childress et al framework of ethical public 
health decision-making and the conflict-of-interest standards in the Nova Scotia 
Chiropractic Act and Regulations. 
The analysis concludes that the legislative scheme fails to adequately regulate 
conflicts of interest and bias in the College’s disciplinary decision-making processes 
through weak or unarticulated standards and high levels of discretion devolved 
to the College. Conflicts of interest within complaint processes threaten patients’ 
health and well-being and diminish public trust in professional self-regulation. This 
case study identifies a need for legislative and policy reforms to better protect 
procedural justice and public accountability in health professional regulation. 
Dans cet article, nous analysons un ensemble de plaintes et de rapports informels 
connexes adressés au Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors (collège des 
chiropraticiens de la Nouvelle Écosse) relativement à une violation présumée de 
la politique du collège en matière de publicité. Cette analyse évalue les éléments 
situationnels des conflits d'intérêts dans le processus de plainte, en particulier les 
doubles rôles et les intérêts professionnels concurrents, par rapport au cadre de 
prise de décision éthique en matière de santé publique élaboré par Childress et 
aux normes relatives aux conflits d'intérêts de la Chiropractic Act and Regulations 
de la Nouvelle Écosse. 
L'analyse conclut que le régime législatif ne parvient pas à réglementer 
adéquatement les conflits d'intérêts et la partialité dans les processus de prise de 
décisions disciplinaires du collège, en raison de normes faibles ou non articulées 
et des niveaux élevés de discrétion dévolus au collège. Les conflits d'intérêts 
dans les processus de plainte menacent la santé et le bien-être des patients 
et diminuent la confiance du public dans l'autorégulation professionnelle. Cette 
étude de cas identifie un besoin de réformes législatives et politiques pour mieux 
protéger la justice procédurale et la responsabilité publique dans la réglementation 
des professionnels de la santé.
* I would like to express my special thanks to Rory Williams for sharing materials related to a 
set of regulatory complaints he made in 2018. These materials provided important support in the 
development of this article’s thesis and analysis. This article’s research was carried out, in part, with 
support from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR PJT 156256). This paper was awarded 
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A basic tenet of health professionals’ work holds that practitioners should 
put the needs of patients and the public ahead of the practitioners’ own 
interests.1 A central idea that flows from this is that any interest that might 
conflict with this priority—that is, anything that might pose a professional 
conflict of interest—should be taken seriously and avoided wherever 
possible. The regulators of health professions frequently address conflicts 
of interest affecting their members, including by undertaking complaint 
and disciplinary proceedings. While much attention has traditionally been 
given to conflicts of interest in professional practice (e.g. in a hospital or 
a clinic), less has been given to conflicts that may involve the regulators 
themselves (that is, within the regulators’ own administrative proceedings). 
To date, it appears that no detailed analysis has been undertaken of cases 
in which this type of conflict may be occurring, nor any comprehensive 
discussion of the nature, scope, and potential implications of these 
situations. However, instances of potential conflicts within regulators’ 
complaint proceedings have recently arisen and in some cases garnered 
media coverage, investigation by regulators, and public concern.2
The analysis to follow initially arose from a set of advertising complaints 
I made to the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors between late 2018 
and early 2019. While chiropractors and other health professionals have 
lately gained scrutiny for misleading advertising related to COVID-19 
treatment,3 many other health conditions have also been the subject of 
advertising concerns. There has been a particular focus on advertising that 
references health benefits but which may not be substantiated by scientific 
evidence.4 My complaints related to practitioners’ online marketing on 
the topic of childhood health conditions—marketing that I was concerned 
might be misleading or harmful to patients or anyone else the advertising 
might reach. 
1. Health professions’ legislation typically includes a reference to serving the public interest. See 
e.g. Health Professions Act, RSBC 1996, c 183, s 16(1)(b) [BCHPA]: “It is the duty of a College at all 
times to serve and protect the public, and to exercise its powers and discharge its responsibilities under 
all enactments in the public interest.”
2. See e.g. Bethany Lindsay, “Vancouver Chiropractor Resigns from College Board over Anti-
vaccine Video” (4 May 2018), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/news/> [perma.cc/M4UE-W39T].
3. See Wallis Snowdon, “Cow Urine, Bleach, Oregano Oil: Medical COVID-19 Quackery Has 
Big Ramifications for Public Health” (3 April 2020), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.cc/4GFG-
U4N4].
4. See e.g. Bethany Lindsay, “There’s An Epidemic of Bogus Health Claims Online, and No Easy 
Cure” (9 June 2018), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/news/> [perma.cc/C2YE-V4VW] [Lindsay Health 
Claims].
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Box 1.  List of Non-Musculoskeletal Health Conditions for which  
Chiropractic was Referenced as Beneficial in Children,  
Tallied from Web Advertising Complaints5









Infection (Ear, Cold, Other) 9
Irritable Bowel 1
Reflux 3
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome 1
My complaints went in, and the results came back several months later: 
all dismissed. This in itself was not necessarily a bad outcome. It is normally 
up to health professions regulatory College staff to make determinations 
about complaints as they see fit, regardless of whether the parties involved 
agree with the result. However, on reviewing the full written evidence I 
had collected by the end of the process, I noticed something interesting 
that had little to do with the substance of the complaints themselves. Based 
on the documents in front of me, it appeared as though many of the same 
parties: 1) had been complained against, 2) had some degree of influence 
over the complaint process, 3) had the ability to control and delete relevant 
evidence prior to adjudication, 4) in most cases did control and delete 
relevant evidence prior to adjudication, 5) were found not responsible for 
any misconduct, and 6) had written decisions issued stating that there was 
5. While chiropractic has supporting evidence of efficacy for some musculoskeletal health conditions, 
its use for non-musculoskeletal conditions, especially in pediatric populations, is controversial and has 
generally been found to lack scientific support (see e.g. Canadian Pediatric Society, “Chiropractic 
Care for Children: Controversies and Issues” (2002) 7:2 Paediatric Child Health 85). Some regulators, 
such as the College of Chiropractors of British Columbia, have prohibited advertising that represents 
chiropractic care as beneficial for childhood health conditions on the grounds that there is not enough 
evidence to accurately support such claims (see College of Chiropractors of British Columbia, 
Efficacy	Claims (Vancouver: CCBC, 2018) s 3, online (pdf): CCBC <www.chirobc.com/> [perma.
cc/34X9-PRXJ]). I used the CCBC’s policy and examples as a guide for assessing websites in Nova 
Scotia. Complaint documents are on file with the author.
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no right of appeal to any of the findings. It also appeared that this was not 
the first time that something like this had occurred. 
In this paper, I will seek to answer two questions about conflicts of 
interest in self-regulating health professions’ complaint proceedings. First, 
when and how might these conflicts occur, and what are their implications 
for public health and for regulators’ mandates? Second, what can be done 
to effectively address these conflicts? In order to answer these questions, 
this paper has two main purposes: to identify and describe the nature 
and scope of this type of conflict of interest, and to survey and evaluate 
possible actions that may address this kind of conflict, particularly options 
for reform.  
In contrast to many jurisdictions, Canada’s professional regulation 
happens mostly at the provincial level, using a model of self-regulation.6 
Canadian models of professional regulation typically include less 
involvement from independent parties (such as members of the public 
or government bodies). Because of the differences between the standard 
Canadian model and the regulatory models used elsewhere in the world, 
this paper’s discussion will primarily be in the context of Canadian 
provincial jurisdiction. However, some reference will be made to models 
in other jurisdictions in order to compare policy responses and their 
potential consequences.  
This analysis draws on a variety of sources, including legal literature 
and case law, as well as some sources from health disciplines and other 
areas. Due to the limited number of published sources dealing with the 
specific subject of administrative conflicts of interest within health 
professions regulators, I will also draw from unpublished complaints made 
to regulatory Colleges in Canada, including the ones I made, in order to 
discuss specific cases in more detail.  
This paper includes three basic parts. In the first section, I provide 
background and legal context, including overviews of self-regulation and 
administrative conflicts of interest. In the second section, I outline the 
nature and scope of conflicts of interest in regulatory complaint processes, 
with reference to specific instances where potential conflicts appear to 
have arisen. I ultimately conclude that these conflicts appear not only 
to contradict commonly recognized ethical principles of public health 
decision-making, but also that they appear to run contrary to the purpose 
of the regulator’s governing legislature. In the third section, I examine 
proposals for policy reforms that may help to address these issues. 
6. See Tracey L Adams, “Self-regulating Professions: Past, Present, Future” (2017) 4 J Professions 
& Organization 70 at 71, 73. 
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2. Background and regulatory context 
a. Overview of self-regulation in Canada 
Professional regulation is intended to assure public health and safety.7 In 
Canada, regulation is governed by the state, through a provincial, territorial, 
or federal government authority.8 However, for most regulated occupations, 
including health professions, the direct work of regulation is delegated to 
a regulatory body, normally called a College, which is comprised mostly 
of members of that profession. The fact that the profession is regulated 
by its own members is what makes these professions “self-regulating.” 
Canadian self-regulating health professions operate in a “closed” fashion: 
only people who meet certain education and competence standards may be 
part of the profession.9 
Professional self-regulation has existed since the 19th century, but 
many professions have become self-regulating more recently within the 
20th and 21st centuries.10 Although the number of regulated professions 
is not consistent by region, provinces and territories regulate dozens of 
different health professions, and as a result, Canadian health care is mostly 
delivered by members of self-regulating professions.  
Just like the professions themselves, discussions of the advantages 
and disadvantages of self-regulation are not new. There are several main 
arguments in favour of self-regulation, including arguments relating to 
administrative efficiency, necessity, economics, and health. For example, 
it may be argued that self-regulation benefits governments through 
increased efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and decreased administrative 
burdens.11 Arguments about necessity, economic benefits, and public 
health arise from the idea of a knowledge gap between the public and 
health professionals. This gap, which exists due to the complexity of the 
service being provided, is termed “information asymmetry.”12 The idea is 
essentially that non-experts do not have enough knowledge to evaluate 
the quality of health care for safety, effectiveness, or efficiency, and so 
7. See Government of Canada, “Regulated Professions and Trades” (11 January 2015), online: GC 
<canadabusiness.ca> [perma.cc/T2QZ-ZADC].
8. Ibid.	
9. See Adams, supra note 6 at 74. 
10. Ibid; see also Naturopathy	Act, 2007, SO 2007, c 10, Sched P. 
11. See Amy Zarzeczny, “The Role of Regulation in Health Care—Professional and Institutional 
Oversight” in Joanna Erdman, Vanessa Gruben & Erin Nelson, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 
5th ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2017) at 171. 
12. Canada, Competition Bureau, Self-Regulated	 Professions:	 Balancing	 Regulation	 and	




health professionals, as experts, should be responsible for ensuring quality 
standards on the public’s behalf.13  
Just as Canada’s model of self-regulation has been defended, it has also 
been criticized for decades. Concerns include bias (particularly in terms of 
practitioners putting their interests ahead of the public interest), insufficient 
transparency, and inadequate monitoring and enforcement of professional 
standards.14 There is also an economic argument that self-regulation 
restrains trade, sometimes in an unnecessary fashion. Additionally, health-
based arguments focus on concerns that where regulators fail to enforce 
standards and the public is not protected from misconduct, members of the 
public may be subjected to a range of harms. 
b. Public health implications of Canadian professional regulation 
model
Professional regulation can influence public health outcomes in several 
ways, both through policy-based “input” regulation practices and 
enforcement-based “output” practices. 
The “input” based public health influence is based around professions’ 
ability to dictate care quality and manner of delivery. Health professions 
define many of the actions and decisions available to their members, from 
education and entry-to-practice standards to ethical obligations and care 
standards.15 As a result, the delivery of health interventions is effectively 
filtered through professional bodies by way of the standards they create 
and impose on members. In this sense, professional bodies are an 
important component of public health, because when the public accesses 
health care, the quality and manner of delivery of that care is mediated by 
the professional body that sets the standards for that care and determines 
who may deliver that care.  
The “output” based public health influence is based in the function of 
regulators as an accountability mechanism for professionals. Regulators 
have the ability to safeguard quality using several means, including 
handling complaints, conducting investigations, and making disciplinary 
decisions.16 Regulators are particularly instrumental in regulating 
professional conduct by way of issuing orders and imposing penalties, 
including fines, practice conditions, and the suspension or revocation of 
13. See Roger Collier, “Professionalism: The Privilege and Burden of Self-regulation” (2012) 14 
Canadian Medical Association Journal 1559 at 1559, online: <www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov> [perma.cc/
D2YV-LLKT]; Competition Bureau, supra note 12 at 19. 




professional registration to practice. The system is intended to protect 
the public from harm or abuse by professionals. However, if it fails to 
effectively monitor and regulate members' activities, the public may 
be at risk of many kinds of harm: some reports of repeat behaviours by 
self-regulated professionals include improperly performed procedures, 
abuse, and even homicide.17 Because of the extensive role that regulators 
have in health care quality and safety assurance, and the range of health 
implications that their effectiveness can have for the public, it is important 
that regulators serve their functions effectively. 
c. Self-regulating health professions legislation and governance  
As previously noted, health professions’ self-regulating bodies exist by 
delegation from a provincial government authority. This is enabled through 
provincial legislation and accompanying regulations, which typically define 
each profession and its respective scope of practice,18 dictate the structure 
of the self-regulating body,19 and grant the self-regulating body specific 
governance powers and obligations.20 The structure of a self-regulating 
body generally includes a governing Board composed mostly or entirely 
of professional members (sometimes with a minority of non-members 
appointed by government),21 and a series of professional committees to 
which the Board sub-delegates its powers of practice standard creation 
and enforcement. Often, the Board or Board Chair may also appoint and 
remove professional committee members and Chairs.22  
d. Professional complaints processes 
One of the main functions of a self-regulating body is to investigate 
professional complaints against members of the profession. This is 
normally undertaken by committees composed of professional and lay 
members who receive and process complaints, gather evidence and conduct 
interviews, and make determinations about whether a member has engaged 
in misconduct or failed to adhere to a standard of professional practice. In 
17. See e.g. Adams, supra note 6 at 78; see also Bethany Lindsay, “Parents ‘Infuriated’ to Learn of 
Past Complaints Against BC Psychologist” (26 October 2019), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.
cc/37UE-ZNKZ].
18. See e.g. BCHPA, supra note 1, ss 12(1), 12(2)(a)-(h) (designating titles that may be held and 
health services that may be performed). 
19. Ibid, ss 15(1), 15(2)(a)-(b) (establishing the College and its basic structure). 
20. Ibid, ss 16(1)(a)-(b), (2)(a)-(j), 19(1)(a)-(z) (outlining the College’s obligation and power to 
establish education requirements, standards of practice, and enforcement). 
21. See e.g. Chiropractic Act, SNS 1999, c 4, s 7(1) [Chiropractic Act]. 
22. Ibid,	s 46(1), 46(5); see also Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors,	Board	Regulations	(Halifax: 




some cases, there may be a complaint investigator who receives complaints 
directly; in others, complaints may be forwarded to the relevant committee 
by another party such as the Registrar. Regulatory bodies (and the relevant 
committees) must normally investigate any complaint brought forward by 
any professional or member of the public. They may also initiate their 
own investigations based on information about professional conduct that 
is brought to their attention, even if it is not formally complained about. 
Once an investigation is complete, a complaint may be dismissed or 
referred to a disciplinary committee, which may in turn impose warnings 
or penalties to members who are found to have contravened a professional 
standard.23 
A central feature of self-regulating professions’ governance is that 
most professional members of each regulator are also practicing members 
of the profession—that is, they provide health care to patients, and they 
also work within the regulatory body to create or enforce professional 
standards. A critical implication of this, for the purpose of this paper’s 
discussion, is that any professional member of any regulatory body may 
potentially be subject to a professional complaint, in addition to having 
an ongoing role in the complaint management process. This can lead 
to professionals having a dual role, acting both as a potential enforcer 
of standards and as a party against whom standards may potentially be 
enforced. 
3.	 Conflicts	of	interest	in	the	context	of	professional	self-regulation	
The legal and health care fields have each developed their own conceptions 
of conflicts of interest. The approaches are similar and overlap in some 
respects, and both are relevant to a health professions regulator, which 
functions as part of the legal system and as part of the health care system. 
a.	 Conflicts	of	interest	in	the	context	of	health	professions	ethics		
In the context of health care, a conflict of interest has been defined as “a 
set of conditions in which professional judgment concerning a primary 
interest (such as a patient’s welfare...) tends to be unduly influenced by a 
secondary interest (such as financial gain).”24 One of the specific health 
implications of a conflict of interest is that it may have a negative impact 
on patient care.25 
23. See e.g. Ontario College of Pharmacists, “Complaints Process,” online: OCP <www.ocpinfo.
com/> [perma.cc/5Z5W-DK3Y].
24. Dennis F Thompson, “Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest” (1993) 329 N Engl J Med 
573 at 575, online: NEJM <www.nejm.org> [perma.cc/8DQH-HC46].
25. Ibid at 574. 
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Canadian self-regulating bodies have generally adopted similar 
conflict of interest definitions in their own College rules, often making 
reference to the best interests of patients. Colleges typically recognize 
conflicts of interest within a clinical setting as a form of professional 
misconduct.26 Regulatory Colleges’ conflict of interest rules often apply to 
a range of situations, including business referrals, product sales, or matters 
involving monetary or personal interests. Some College Boards also have 
specific guidelines outlining procedures for addressing conflicts of interest 
affecting Board and committee members carrying out College functions.27 
The governing legislation of self-regulators sometimes references conflicts 
of interest as well, typically with a focus on conflicts that may directly 
affect patient care.28 
b.	 Conflicts	of	interest	in	the	common	law	context	
In instances where a conflict of interest occurs within an administrative body 
like a health professions regulator, common law principles of procedural 
fairness that address conflicts of interest and bias are engaged. These 
principles are well-recognized and ordinarily apply to any administrative 
decisions made by staff within a regulator, unless a statute clearly provides 
otherwise.
One main issue that arises where registrants have influence over 
complaint processes in which they also have a professional interest is the 
potential for financial conflicts of interest. It has been recognized that where 
an adjudicator (or someone connected to the adjudicator) may benefit or 
suffer financially from a decision, bias is presumed,29 and the adjudicator 
should typically be disqualified from taking part in the decision.30 This 
is directly relevant to regulatory complaints processes, where complaints 
against registrants may have consequences that affect registrants’ finances 
directly (via monetary penalties) or indirectly (via impacts on professional 
reputation or ability to practice). Given the range of possible disciplinary 
26.  See Debra LC Zelisko, Managing	 Conflict	 Of	 Interest	 In	 Healthcare:	 The	 Roles	 Of	
Professionalism	And	Regulatory	Colleges (PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2015) at 72-73 
[unpublished], online: U	of	T	<tspace.library.utoronto.ca> [https://perma.cc/HTZ5-HGMY] (noting 
several Ontario Colleges defining COIs as professional misconduct).
27. See e.g. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, “Governance Policy: GP-10 
Conflict of Interest” (19 January 2018), online: CPSS <www.cps.sk.ca/> [https://perma.cc/G66U-
4Z9N].
28. See e.g. College of Registered Nurses of Alberta, Bylaws (revised September 2019) s 36.5, 
online (pdf): CARNA	<nurses.ab.ca/> [perma.cc/PS62-ZUKY]. 
29. See Sara Blake, “Discretion and Bias” in Administrative Law in Canada, 6th Ed (Toronto: 
LexisNexis, 2017) at 121. 
30. See David J Mullan, Administrative Law, 3rd Ed, (Toronto: Carswell, 1996) at 293. 
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sanctions, from fines to de-registration,31 and the possibility of decisions 
against registrants being made public,32 a registrant’s livelihood may be 
affected by the outcome of a complaint, resulting in a financial conflict.  
As a result, any practising registrant with influence over any part of 
their own complaint process will presumably have a financial stake in the 
outcome of that process, and as a result would presumably be unable to 
participate as an impartial decision-maker. This conflict would most clearly 
affect registrants serving on complaints or disciplinary committees, who 
have direct power to determine the outcome of a complaint. However, it 
could also affect other members of the regulatory body, including executive 
and Board members who have complaints made against them. This is 
because some of these members may potentially serve on the committees 
at the time the complaints are made, and these registrants often have the 
ability to decide whether to proceed with the complaint, make disciplinary 
decisions regarding the complaint, or control which members serve on 
committees that process complaints. 
The second issue underlying potential conflicts is the dual role that 
can arise where parties subjected to complaints also have decision-making 
roles connected to the complaint process. One type of dual role that may 
undermine procedural fairness is when a party can be both a defendant 
and a formal adjudicator (or investigator) in a complaint process. Where 
regulatory tribunals are concerned, it has been recognized that members 
should not judge complaints against themselves or preside over hearings if 
they have been involved in the matter being heard.33 Such a dual function is 
normally treated as an inherent conflict of interest. An exception to this is 
cases where dual roles have been authorized by statute.34 However, statutes 
generally authorize an overlap between investigatory and adjudicatory 
roles, and not an overlap between being a party and being an investigator 
or a judge. Such an overlap would also be contrary to longstanding, 
fundamental procedural fairness principles: for example, an early Quebec 
Court of Appeal case regarding the province’s College of Dental Surgeons 
stated that the possibility of a dual plaintiff-judge or defendant-judge 
role was “not even open for discussion.”35 This is particularly relevant to 
formal investigations undertaken by a regulator, where an Investigation 
31. See e.g. Chiropractic	Act,	supra	note 21, s 60(2)(e)(i). 
32. Ibid, s 88(1), (2). 
33. See Blake, supra note 29 at 121, citing Great	Atlantic	and	Pacific	Co	of	Canada	Ltd	v	Ontario	
(Human	 Rights	 Commission),	 [1993] 13 OR (3d) 824, 109 DLR (4th) 214 (ONSC); Griffin	 v	
Summerside	(City)	Director	of	Police	Services, [1998] PEIJ No 30 at para 34, 159 DLR (4th) 698 
(PEISC).   
34. See Blake, supra note 29 at 121. 
35. Maillet	v	College	of	Dental	Surgeons (1921), 58 DLR 210 at 211, 34 CCC 138 (Que CA). 
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Committee may have at least two practising registrants and one member 
who is not a member of the profession—a situation that may allow for 
a majority of Committee members to potentially be in a dual-role if a 
complaint is ever made against them.36   
Another type of dual role can arise from less formal administrative 
roles, i.e. decisions that fall outside the formal complaint process. Beyond 
formal hearings or investigations, decision-making roles within any stage 
of the complaint process may give rise to a conflict affecting procedural 
fairness in cases where a decision-maker has a competing personal or 
professional interest. This can include the stage of deciding whether 
to forward a complaint for investigation, or whether and how to gather 
and handle evidence. In Baker v Canada, a leading decision regarding 
procedural fairness, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that the level 
of importance of a decision on the lives of those affected is a significant 
factor in determining a duty of procedural fairness.37 Where the level of 
importance is higher, the level of fairness required will also increase. 
Administrative decisions that may ultimately start, finish, or affect the 
course of a complaint would seem to have a high level of importance. This 
is in part because they may lead to significant professional consequences, 
which the court in Baker used as an example of a situation in which a high 
standard of fairness is required (specifically referencing a professional 
disciplinary decision, in the form of a suspension).38 At the same time, 
decisions about investigations may also affect the lives of complainants 
and the public, as concerns about health professionals will often be related 
to health or safety. Both sets of impacts would probably have a high level of 
personal importance for affected individuals, one that attracts a significant 
duty of procedural fairness that a dual-role conflict would undermine. 
Part II 
1.	 Scope	and	description	of	conflicts	within	regulators	
This section provides a basic account of the nature and potential 
implications of cases in which members of self-regulating bodies appear 
to have control over, or involvement in, the decision-making processes 
regarding complaints against themselves. It begins with an overview of 
instances in which these types of conflicts appear to have arisen. Following 
36. Chiropractic	Act,	supra note 21, s 46(1)–(3). 
37. See Baker	v	Canada	(Minister	of	Citizenship	and	Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) at para 
25, [1999] 2 SCR 817. 
38. Ibid at para 25, citing Kane v Board of Governors of the University of British Columbia, 1980 
CanLII 10 (SCC), [1980] 1 SCR 1105 at 1113. 
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this will be a discussion of the ethical and legal considerations that may 
apply to such cases. 
a.	 Sources	suggesting	extent	of	conflicts	within	regulators		
The existing evidence around possible conflicts of interest affecting health 
professions regulators has largely been centered around practitioners’ 
advertising practices, possibly because these practices are more publicly 
visible (and therefore more likely to be reported). Canada’s health 
professions regulators typically have advertising policies requiring that all 
information contained in their registrants’ marketing should be accurate 
and verifiable.39 However, research suggests that in self-regulating 
professions across many provinces, a large percentage of practitioners 
(or even a majority in some cases) may be making factually unsupported 
health claims online,40 potentially in violation of their regulatory Colleges’ 
advertising policies.  
There has been a particularly large number of reports of this issue 
occurring in professions associated with Complementary and Alternative 
Medicine (CAM). Some experts have cited the lack of a strong evidentiary 
basis behind many CAM practices, as well as the common use of CAM 
by those who are distrustful of conventional medical practices, as reasons 
why factually unsupported health in this area may be more common.41 
However, concerns about misleading advertising also exist across more 
mainstream health professions.42  
Because it is common for professional Board and committee 
members (i.e. governing members) to be actively practising members of 
their profession, and because most practising members advertise their 
services, it is perhaps unsurprising that governing members of Colleges 
have sometimes been implicated in advertising complaints. For example, 
one governing member of the College of Chiropractors of Ontario 
39. See e.g. Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, Board	 Policy:	 Advertising (Halifax: NSCC, 
2019) s 4, online (pdf): NSCC	<drive.google.com/> [perma.cc/7ELX-L8ZN] [NSCC Ad Policy]; see 
also College of Physiotherapists of Ontario, Advertising Standard (Toronto: CPTO, 2019), online: 
CPTO	 <www.collegept.org/> [perma.cc/ER3Q-CUY9]; College of Dietitians of Alberta, Code of 
Ethics (Edmonton: CDA, 2008) ss 3.5, 3.7, online (pdf): CDA <collegeofdietitians.ab.ca/> [perma.
cc/2HDW-R82D].
40. See e.g. Blake Murdoch, Stuart Carr & Timothy Caulfield, “Selling Falsehoods? A Cross-
Sectional Study of Canadian Naturopathy, Homeopathy, Chiropractic and Acupuncture Clinic Website 
Claims Relating to Allergy and Asthma” (2016) 6:12 BMJ, online: BMJ	 <bmjopen.bmj.com/> 
[perma.cc/7AJM-R8DT]; see also Timothy Caulfield & Christen Rachul, “Supported by Science?: 
What Canadian Naturopaths Advertise to the Public” (2011) 7:14 AACI 7 at 7, online: NCBI	<www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/> [perma.cc/6UY2-VPWM]. 
41. See e.g. Lindsay Health Claims, supra note 4.
42. Ibid; see also Leanne Loranger, “Good Practice: Are you Selling Snake Oil?” (30 April 2015), 
online: CPTA	<www.physiotherapyalberta.ca/> [perma.cc/29WJ-FXD6].
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was subject to a complaint about anti-vaccination statements in 2019. 
Although she lost her seat on the College council in an election shortly 
afterward, multiple other members of the College who had also made anti-
vaccination statements remained on the council,43 and as of July 2020, no 
disciplinary action regarding the complaint has been reported.44 A similar 
issue of potential conflicts of interest arose when I made a set of informal 
reports to the College of Naturopaths of British Columbia (CNBC) about 
practitioners advertising alternative therapies for cancer.45 At the time 
the reports were sent, four of the College members I reported were listed 
as being on the CNBC Board, and one member was listed as serving on 
the College’s Discipline Committee.46 In some cases, it is professionals 
themselves who come forward with allegations that their regulatory 
Colleges are not adequately enforcing advertising standards, or that 
governing members of Colleges may not be following the standards. For 
example, members of the British Columbia Chiropractic Association, 
a voluntary professional body, reportedly complained to the College of 
Chiropractors of British Columbia over a two-year period about anti-
vaccine content posted by their fellow registrants online, including 
postings by one registrant who was the College’s Vice Chair at the time.47 
The high prevalence of misleading advertising among practising 
members of health professions, in combination with the high prevalence of 
governing members being practising members, suggests that there may be 
potential for widespread conflicts of interest within many self-regulatory 
bodies across Canada, since many professionals may be engaging in at 
least one practice (misleading advertising) that may contravene the same 
policies the professionals are responsible for enforcing. If Colleges are 
charged with enforcing policies against members, but governing members 
43. National Post, “As One Anti-Vaccination Sympathizer is Voted off Ontario’s Chiropractic 
Regulatory Body, Another is Voted on” (16 April 2019), online: National	Post	<nationalpost.com/> 
[perma.cc/V7HW-T8FG].
44. See College of Chiropractors of Ontario, “Discipline Hearings and Decisions,” online: <www.
cco.on.ca/> [perma.cc/3PN4-GUZ2].
45. See Letter from Andrea MacGregor to the College of Naturopathic Physicians of British 
Columbia (5 February 2019), titled “Advertising Concerns: Online Claims Regarding Cancer 
Treatment and Screening” [unpublished].
46. See College of Naturopathic Physicians of British Columbia, Board,	online: Wayback	Machine 
<web.archive.org/>; College of Naturopathic Physicians of British Columbia, Committees,	online: 
Wayback	 Machine	 <web.archive.org/> (showing the members of the Board and the Discipline 
Committee in February 2019).
47. See Bethany Lindsay, “Ministry Considered Options for Handling ‘Dysfunctional’ Chiropractors 




of the College are violating those same policies, the College’s interest in 
policy enforcement may be substantially undermined.  
b.	 Overview	of	specific	instances	of	potential	conflicts:	N.S.	College	of	
Chiropractors 
In November 2018, the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors President 
and Board Chair were named in a set of complaints alleging that some 
College members were contravening advertising policies by sharing anti-
vaccine content online. According to the complainant, the College had not 
taken any disciplinary action as of December 2018, and no notice of any 
decision has been published on the College’s disciplinary webpage as of 
the date of this paper’s submission.48 
My own complaints were also in relation to registrants’ advertising 
practices. After hearing of the initial anti-vaccine advertising complaints, 
I compiled a survey of College registrants’ online advertising practices 
in relation to childhood health conditions. This survey revealed that 
nearly 25% of practitioners registered with the College had a website 
that contained at least one reference to chiropractic being beneficial to 
non-musculoskeletal childhood health conditions (such as ADHD, colic, 
autism, or ear infections). The wording of these references was often 
similar or identical across multiple practitioners’ websites. According to 
health experts, there is insufficient scientific evidence to support these 
statements about childhood conditions,49 and chiropractic regulators 
in other jurisdictions, including British Columbia, have made explicit 
policies prohibiting the use of these representations in their practitioners’ 
advertising.50 However, the Nova Scotia Chiropractic College has not 
adopted this rule (although the College does have an advertising policy 
requiring that advertising claims be accurate and verifiable).51 In addition 
to the practitioners whose websites contained childhood conditions 
references, another 15% of practitioners claimed to perform treatments 
for babies or infants. This claim itself is not misleading, but it has been 
described by medical experts as potentially unsafe and also unlikely to be 
48. See Letter from Rory Williams to the Nova Scotia Minister of Health (9 December 2018) 
[unpublished]; Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, Disciplinary Findings, online:	NSCC	<www.
chiropractors.ns.ca/> [perma.cc/Q26Y-YDTZ]. 
49. See e.g. Sharon Kirkey, “Pediatricians Alarmed by Chiropractic Treatments for Babies That 
‘Border on the Fraudulent’” (8 May 2018), online: National	 Post	 <nationalpost.com/> [perma.
cc/4T49-XV4M]; see also Samuel Homola, “Pediatric Chiropractic Care: The Subluxation Question 
and Referral Risk” (2016) 30:2 Bioethics 63 at 63, online: Wiley <onlinelibrary.wiley.com/> [perma.
cc/FWY7-TZ8F].
50. See College of Chiropractors of British Columbia, Efficacy	Claims (Vancouver: CCBC 2018) s 
3, online (pdf): CCBC <www.chirobc.com/> [perma.cc/34X9-PRXJ].
51. See NSCC Ad Policy, supra note 39. 
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of medical benefit, and as such, it may engage concerns about safety and 
about the promotion of unnecessary treatment, even if it is not explicitly 
addressed in College standards.52 
In total, 41 practitioners had websites with representations about 
childhood health conditions, and 26 additional practitioners did not 
reference childhood conditions but claimed to treat babies or infants. 
Initially, all practitioners and websites were reported to the College 
informally in December of 2018.53 The College’s original response was 
to decline to investigate.54 The College did not give any reasons for its 
decision not to begin an investigation or otherwise act on the reports, 
stating that it was under no duty to give reasons. However, the College did 
state that to have the complaints investigated, each complaint would need 
to be filed formally using a standardized complaint template. The template 
requires a complainant to state their full name, address, and other contact 
information, and to provide a description of the nature of the complaint 
(which can include any written or visual evidence the complainant would 
like to rely on). The form states that all of this information is forwarded 
to every party who is complained against.55 The College confirmed that 
this is the case even for the complaints at hand, which were based entirely 
on publicly available website information, where the complainant would 
not be needed for the purpose of testimony, and where the complainant’s 
personal information would not be relevant to the outcome of the decision.56 
Following this response, any websites that still contained childhood 
condition references were formally reported in March of 2019 (for a total 
of 19 formal complaints against 18 practitioners, as some practitioners 
shared a single website and other websites had since been modified to 
remove the references).57 The practitioners whose websites were formally 
complained against included three of eight professional members of the 
College Board (including the Board Chair), as well as one of two members 
who served as Chairs of the Investigative Committee during the time the 
complaints were active.58 
52. See Kirkey, supra note 49; Homola,	supra note 49 at 63. 
53. See Letter from Andrea MacGregor to the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors (12 December 
2018) titled “Online Advertising Complaint” [unpublished] [Ad Complaint]. 
54. See Letter from the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors to Andrea MacGregor (3 January 
2019) titled “Complaint N SCC 4.6.59 Andrea McGregor” [sic] [unpublished]. 
55. See Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, “Complaint Form/Authorization and Consent to 
Investigate” at 4, online (pdf): NSCC	<drive.google.com/> [perma.cc/T4PG-PZCS]. 
56. See Letter from the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors to Andrea MacGregor (4 March 2019) 
titled “Complaint NSCC 4.6.59 Andrea McGregor” [sic] [unpublished]. 
57. See Message from Andrea MacGregor to the Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors (27 March 
2019) reply to “Complaint N SCC 4.6.59 Andrea McGregor” [sic] [unpublished]. 
58. See Nova Scotia College of Chiropractors, The	 Board	 of	 the	 Nova	 Scotia	 College	 of	
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Importantly, the Board Chair has the ability to appoint, grant powers to, 
and repeal the Chairs of the Investigative Committee (which investigates 
complaints) and the Hearing Committee (which carries out hearings and 
disciplinary decisions).59 An additional Board member and Investigative 
Committee Chair had also originally been named in the informal reports 
that were not investigated.60 The Board collectively has the power to 
appoint the members of the Investigation Committee, and a majority of 
people on the Investigative and Hearing Committees may also be current 
or former Board members.61 In total, seven of ten governing members of 
the College who were known to have a connection to the complaint process 
had a website that was subject to a formal complaint or an informal report. 
Of particular note is that six of the ten governing members had websites 
that were subject to complaints or informal reports about the same subject 
matter (advertising references about childhood conditions). This means 
that most of the College’s governing members who were known either to 
be involved in the complaints process,62 or to have the power to decide 
who could be involved in the complaints process, had their own websites 
subjected to a formal complaint or informal report about the same subject 
matter as one another. 
Each registrant who received a complaint responded in writing in 
April of 2019. In June and July of 2019, the College issued decisions for 
each formal complaint, opting to dismiss all of them. In a majority of 
cases,63 according to the College, the online material in question had been 
removed from the websites by the time investigators attempted to review 
it, resulting in the College being unable to review the material. The College 
then found insufficient evidence for any finding of professional misconduct 
or adjudication by a Hearing Committee. (This was notwithstanding that 
Chiropractors, online: NSCC	<www.chiropractors.ns.ca/> [perma.cc/96GP-K5LP] (listing the College 
Board members) [NSCC	Board]; NSCC, Cover	Letter	and	Decision	4.6.68;	4.6.70;	4.6.75;	4.6.77	
[unpublished] (noting the reported websites with which the members and Investigation Committee 
Chairs were associated); Chiropractic Nova Scotia, Directory [a collection of Directory weblinks is on 
file with the author] (showing that the same members listed on the Board page are the operators of the 
websites listed in decision numbers 68, 70, 75, and 77, respectively). 
59. See Board	Regulations,	supra note 22, ss 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.5. 
60. See Ad Complaint, supra note 53 (included reports against websites associated with Investigative 
Committee Chair and Board member); Chiropractic Nova Scotia, Directory [a collection of Directory 
weblinks is on file with the author] (showing that the members are the operators of the websites listed 
in the reports). 
61. Chiropractic	Act,	supra note 21, ss 46(1)–(3), 52(3). 
62. See NSCC	Board,	supra note 58 (“The Board governs, controls and administers the regulatory and 
administrative affairs of the College... The Board’s functions include... complaints and investigation”). 
63. Thirteen of nineteen cases contained similar statements: NSCC, Cover Letter and Decision 
4.6.62;	4.6.63;	4.6.65;	4.6.66;	4.6.67;	4.6.68;	4.6.73;	4.6.74;	4.6.75;	4.6.76;	4.6.77;	4.6.78;	4.6.80	
(2019) [unpublished] [NSCC Decisions]. 
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dated screenshots from the websites had been provided in the complaints, 
and that in some instances, the original webpages are still visible in public 
web archives.)64 Two follow-up surveys in August and October of 2019 
found that most references captured in the original complaint screenshots 
were no longer displayed on the websites. However, 15 practitioners whose 
advertising was reported had not removed the original references, and 
another seven practitioners had removed material that had been captured in 
reported screenshots but still had other online content referencing childhood 
conditions. As of the time of this paper’s submission, approximately 10% 
of the province’s practitioners still appear to be representing on their 
websites that chiropractic may benefit childhood conditions.65 
Following the final outcomes of the reports and complaints, the College 
and Investigative Committee did not at any point state that registrants 
should not represent that chiropractic may be beneficial for childhood 
health conditions, although some decisions stated that registrants should 
not expressly claim to treat or cure childhood health conditions. 
2. Discussion of issues raised 
a.	 Childress framework and ethical concerns relating to the public 
interest 
Professional ethics is an important aspect of health professions generally, 
but it is particularly relevant to discuss here because ethical considerations 
are often a feature of health professions legislation, with conflicts of 
interest being a common kind of ethical concern within health professions. 
The Chiropractic Act includes several mentions of ethics generally, and 
conflicts of interest specifically. Section 4(3) of the Act states that “In order 
that the public interest may be served and protected, the objects of the 
College are to... establish, maintain and develop standards of professional 
ethics among its members.”66 Section 3(a) of the Regulations further notes 
that “professional misconduct” includes “a breach of the Act, regulations 
or by-laws of the Council,”67 which can include ethical standards. The 
Regulations, By-laws, and College standards include a Regulation 
addressing corporation conflicts of interest and undertakings contrary to 
ethical practice,68 a By-law regarding Board conflicts of interest,69 and a 
64. Example weblinks are on file with the author.
65. A survey and collection of weblinks are on file with the author. 
66. See Chiropractic	Act,	supra note 21, s 4(3)(a). 
67. NS Reg 130/2001, s 3(a). 
68. NS Reg 130/2001, s 32. 




professional Code of Ethics (which has previously been treated as a source 
of misconduct findings by the College).70 These examples show that ethics 
and conflicts of interest are an important concern embedded within the 
College’s governing statutes and practices, and the decisions of its staff 
must be considered in light of this.  
Accordingly, this section discusses the ethical implications of the 
College’s decisions, with reference to the public health decision-making 
framework outlined by James Childress et al,71 which has been described 
by other ethics scholars as “the state of the art in the field.”72 The framework 
generally looks first to the moral concerns raised in a particular situation, 
and then to any justificatory considerations that may apply where moral 
concerns appear to be infringed.73 This section looks at the possible moral 
concerns and justifications relevant to the cases at hand, including any 
potential justificatory problems.  
A central idea underpinning the Childress framework is that of public 
trust and accountability. According to the authors, “Public accountability 
requires an openness to public deliberation and imposes an obligation 
on decision-makers to provide honest information and justifications for 
their decisions.”74 Public accountability should, at a minimum, involve 
transparently seeking information from affected parties and disclosing 
relevant information publicly in order to maintain public trust.75 
i.	 Moral	concerns	raised		
The cases set out above raise several moral concerns outlined in the 
framework. The first is a privacy concern. The only manner in which 
members of the public could ensure their concerns are investigated would 
be to have their full names and contact information be automatically 
forwarded to all parties complained against. This would result in the 
disclosure of their personal information to numerous adverse parties, 
potentially infringing the complainants’ information privacy. The second 
concern engaged is harm avoidance. Since the concerns in question 
involved potential misconduct, the cases involve a risk of misconduct going 
unchecked if the concerns are not acted upon by the College, potentially 
70. See Nova	Scotia	College	of	Chiropractors	and	Dena	Churchill	(Notice	of	Hearing)	(1 Nov 2018) 
(NSCC), online (pdf): NSCC	<www.chiropractors.ns.ca/> [perma.cc/XWA8-HWKP]. 
71. See James E Childress et al, “Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain” (2002) 30:2 JL Med & 
Ethics 170. 
72. See Kalle Grill & Angus Dawson, “Ethical Frameworks in Public Health Decision-Making: 
Defending a Value-Based and Pluralist Approach” (2015) 25:4 Health Care Analysis 291 at 291, 
online: Springer <link.springer.com/article/> [perma.cc/MCY2-YLZU].
73. See Childress, supra note 71 at 173. 
74. See ibid at 175. 
75. See	ibid.	
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resulting in public harm. The third major concern is one of distributive 
justice, which entails a fair distribution of benefits and burdens among 
affected parties. This concern may be infringed if a member of the public 
must commit time, resources, and personal information to bringing an 
already publicly visible matter forward to the College. This process may 
be intimidating and burdensome for complainants. 
ii.	 	Justificatory	conditions		
Having identified concerns that may be have been infringed by the 
decisions underlying the College investigation process, the discussion will 
now move to a consideration of the possible justifications for potentially 
infringing decisions, both in terms of the formal complaints and informal 
concerns involved. The justifications put forward by Childress et al, 
which will be discussed in turn, include considerations of a decision’s 
effectiveness, proportionality, necessity, least infringement, transparency, 
and public accountability.  
Effectiveness	and	proportionality		
According to the Childress framework, decisions must be assessed for 
effectiveness, and “it is essential to show that infringing one or more general 
moral considerations will probably protect public health.”76 Additionally, 
the positive effects of the decision should outweigh the negative effects. 
Relevance	to	formal	complaints	
The concern of harm reduction is relevant here, since the complaints 
revolved around an activity that was alleged to be harmful to the public by 
way of deception. The College’s apparent action of not gathering its own 
evidence from the websites before informing the website owners of the 
investigation (resulting in the deletion of text evidence) raises questions 
of effectiveness. The College suggested in some of its final decisions that 
the complainant’s evidence alone was insufficient for a full assessment 
of the online communications as they appeared prior to removal,77 but 
the College appeared to preserve no other evidence in these cases. From 
the College’s perspective, there may be a reasonable argument that these 
decisions were effective because any potentially harmful online text is no 
longer visible to the public, and the risk of harm that may come from a lack 
of determination about the original text is outweighed by the conservation 
of College resources that may also be needed for other public-interest 
activities. However, these positive effects may not outweigh the level 
76. See ibid at 173. 
77. See e.g. NSCC, Cover	Letter	and	Decision	4.6.62;	4.6.65	[unpublished]. 
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of harm that could ensue if the text was indeed harmful and might be 
reposted due to a lack of disciplinary action or other intervention, as well 
as the fact that the investigation may not appear to have been thorough 
from the public’s perspective. 
Relevance	to	informal	concerns	
In terms of harm reduction concerns, it is not clear how declining to 
investigate without issuing reasons was beneficial to the public. This 
is especially true in light of the fact that some of the text the College 
initially declined to investigate was eventually found to be problematic 
by the College following a subsequent formal investigation. It could be 
argued that the decision not to investigate the concerns was again based 
on a consideration of resource efficiency. However, without reasons being 
issued, it is unclear how the potential costs and benefits of declining to 
investigate were evaluated. As a result, the effectiveness and proportionality 
of the decision with respect to public health appears doubtful. 
Necessity	and	least	infringement	
Where a decision infringes a moral consideration, it is important to be 
able to show that the decision was necessary, and that there was no less-
infringing alternative available.  
Relevance	to	formal	complaints	
With respect to privacy and distributive justice concerns, it is unclear why 
a complainant’s personal information would need to be forwarded to all 
parties complained against and why repeatedly submitting the College’s 
complaint form against each individual practitioner would be the only 
acceptable format. This is especially the case given that forwarding 
personal contact information to defendant registrants is not required 
under the Nova Scotia Chiropractic Act, and regulatory Colleges in other 
provinces have accepted confidential reports that were written in various 
formats and did not require a complainant’s contact information to be 
disclosed to every potential defendant.78 This alternative would seemingly 
be less infringing of a complainant’s personal privacy, and potentially a 
more efficient means of accepting reported concerns. 
Relevance	to	informal	reports	
Without reasons being issued, it is unclear whether the College considered 
any alternatives to disregarding the informal concerns. The College noted 
that the Chiropractic Act does not enumerate any factors that must be 
78. See e.g. Letter from the College of Chiropractors of British Columbia to Andrea MacGregor (30 
November 2018) [unpublished]. 
360	 The	Dalhousie	Law	Journal
considered when the Registrar or Investigative Committee are deciding 
on a discretionary basis about whether to investigate an informal report. 
Despite this lack of guidance, some alternative strategies may have been 
possible. The College of Chiropractors of British Columbia acted on 
informally reported concerns regarding its own registrants, ultimately 
giving some practitioners informal warnings about their content without 
carrying out a full investigation.79 This alternative strategy would seem 
to strike a balance between resource constraint considerations and the 
need to ensure that practitioners are following professional standards. It is 
unclear why this, or another alternative, was not chosen. 
Public accountability and transparency 
Where public accountability may be employed to justify a decision, 
the importance of honest information and justification is heightened.80 
Transparency as an aspect of accountability is highly relevant in this 
situation, where a College has decided to decline first to investigate, and 
then to discipline, its own members.  
Relevance	to	formal	complaints	
In the case of the formal complaints, the College’s written decisions 
could arguably be considered appropriately transparent in a situation 
where possible harm to the public is being considered. However, the 
reasons did not address any potential conflicts among staff who acted on 
the complaints. As a result, it is unclear how conflicts were addressed 
and whether they were addressed effectively. In particular, it is unclear 
whether the complaint-processing members’ advance knowledge of the 
complaints against themselves had any bearing on the decision to allow 
members to delete textual evidence before the evidence was reviewed. 
Without a transparent explanation for these decisions, it may appear that 
members were allowed to act on “inside knowledge” about the complaints 
by deleting evidence and avoiding potential penalties that might ensue 
from a later investigation.  
Relevance	to	informal	reports	
In the case of the informal reports, there was no written explanation for 
the decision not to investigate. The College’s position was that the choice 
to take no action did not constitute a decision at all, and so no written 
justification was needed. Given that the reports were informal, the choice 
79. See e.g. Bethany Lindsay, “College Registrar Says ‘I won’t Hesitate’ to File Complaints on 
Chiropractors’ False Claims” (10 November 2018), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.cc/F4HL-
YD67]. 
80. See Childress, supra note 71 at 175.
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not to investigate may indeed be considered an informal choice, rather 
than a formal decision in the traditional sense. However, the fact that there 
was concern about public harm, and that a formal report would not give the 
College any additional relevant information, and that there were possible 
conflicts of interest that could later be discovered, supports a higher level 
of transparency. Without written reasons and the ability to appeal, the 
situation could give the impression that the College could reject a report 
without any clear rationale.  
b. Statutory interpretation concerns relating to the public interest 
In addition to the ethical concerns outlined above, these cases raise further 
issues regarding whether the College’s decisions were carried out in 
accordance with the purpose of the Chiropractic Act. The Act ultimately 
governs all of the College’s duties and activities, including those related 
to complaint investigation decisions, oversight decisions, recusal and 
evidence-handling decisions, and informal report handling decisions. This 
section turns to a purposive interpretation of the Act and a discussion of 
whether the College’s interpretation of its duties and abilities under the Act 
were in accord with the Act’s ultimate purpose as it relates to the public 
interest. 
i.	 Purposive	 interpretation	 of	 the	 NS	 Chiropractic Act:	 The	 public	
interest	and	the	avoidance	of		onflicts	among	governing	members	
The accepted starting point for interpreting statutes is the modern approach 
set out by E. A. Driedger and adopted in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes:    
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an 
Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and 
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of 
the Act, and the intention of Parliament.81 
The decisions of the College were based in the College’s understanding 
of the text of the Act. Those same decisions, however, also appear to have 
led to significant conflicts within the complaint process. A purposive 
reading of the Act leads to the conclusion that the College’s interpretation, 
one that allows for extensive conflicts within the regulator, cannot be in 
accordance with the Act’s purpose of protecting and serving the public 
interest.  
81. Rizzo	&	Rizzo	Shoes	Ltd	(Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 21, 36 OR (3d) 418 [Rizzo]. 
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The	object	of	the	Act	
The Chiropractic Act, like most health professions legislation, has a 
written purpose that explicitly focuses on the public interest: as previously 
mentioned, section 4(3) of the Act states that the objects of the Act exist “[i]
n order that the public interest may be served and protected.”82 Regulation 
of chiropractors in a manner that serves the public interest is evidently the 
central purpose of the Act, and all parts of the legislative scheme should be 
read with this central goal in mind. 
The	scheme	of	the	Act 
The public interest is not defined within the Chiropractic Act or 
Regulations. However, several parts of the scheme outline practices that 
serve to reduce the potential for conflicts of interest, which suggests that a 
consideration of conflicts is an important aspect of considering the public 
interest. The relevant aspects of the legislative scheme include the creation 
of multiple branches of the College which are given separate governance 
functions, as well as a regulation restricting chiropractors from engaging 
in conflicted business practices.83 These will be discussed in more detail 
shortly, within the context of the Act’s legislative history. These aspects 
of the scheme illustrate that the need for conflict avoidance is written into 
the scheme of the Act, denoting that conflict avoidance is connected to the 
central purpose that the Act exists to enable: serving and protecting the 
public interest.  
The	intention	of	the	Legislature	
The Nova Scotia Legislature’s concern with conflicts of interest in the 
regulation of chiropractic is made clear by a set of 1999 legislative 
amendments, the preceding debates regarding the amendments, and the 
most recent guidance document created by the provincial government 
to provide information on the process of granting new professions self-
regulating status. All of these factors support an understanding that 
the Legislature intended for conflicts to be prevented in the College’s 
regulatory functions. 
The 1999 amendments to the Act and Regulations specifically 
addressed conflicts of interest within the College and among registrants. 
The Act was amended to create two bodies within the regulator: a Board, 
charged with functions related to regulating registrants, and a Council, 
charged with functions relating to the development of the profession 
82. Chiropractic	Act,	supra note 21, s 4(3). 
83. Ibid, ss 6(1), 6(2), 89, 90; NS Reg 130/2001, s 32 [NS Reg 130/2001]. 
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itself. Essentially, the amendment served to separate roles and interests 
within the College that might otherwise conflict (i.e. those of professional 
promotion versus those of professional oversight). The amendments to the 
Regulations added a conflict of interest clause prohibiting chiropractors 
from having professional corporations that engaged in any conflicts of 
interest or unethical practices.84 This served to ensure that chiropractors 
would not engage in unethical or conflicted practices through their 
businesses, in addition to not engaging in these practices personally. 
The debates recorded in Hansard further illustrate that the 
Legislature’s purpose in enacting the 1999 amendments was to prevent 
conflicts of interest within the College and among practising registrants. 
Members in the debates state that the Act’s amendments are intended to 
address conflicts of interest and confusion of roles within the regulator 
by separating the functions of professional regulation from those of 
professional promotion.85 There is also an explanation that this separation 
is important for public confidence and for the protection of people who 
use regulated health services.86 The debates additionally mention that the 
Regulations amendments are intended to address conflicts and “would 
ensure that practitioners are not inappropriately shielded against the 
liability claims of patients.”87 
Of further note is that the debates make specific reference to past 
advertising representations by chiropractors purporting to treat cancer 
with chiropractic (a claim that, like childhood conditions representations, 
lacks supporting scientific evidence).88 These advertisements are described 
as being “morally wrong and unethical,” but the debate speaker explains 
that “we don’t see that sort of thing anymore,” and that the profession 
has “truly come together” since the time these advertisements had been 
published.89 Taken together, the statements from the debates support the 
idea that the Legislature intended for chiropractors to avoid conflicts of 
interest in their regulatory and clinical practices, and that additionally, the 
Legislature had a specific expectation that chiropractors would not engage 
in misleading advertising about health conditions. 
84. NS Reg 130/2001, supra note 83. 
85. See Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 58th Leg, 2nd Sess (16 November 1999) at 
2134 (Hon J Muir).  
86. See Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 58th Leg, 2nd Sess (19 November 1999) at 
2408 (Hon Dr J Smith). 
87. Muir, supra note 85 at 2134. 
88. See e.g. Cancer Research UK, “Chiropractic” (18 Jan 2019), online: <www.cancerresearchuk.
org/> [perma.cc/K8TE-LAVC].
89. Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, 58th Leg, 2nd Sess (16 November 1999) at 2140 
(Hon Dr J Smith).  
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In addition to past amendments and debates concerning the 
Chiropractic Act, more recent actions from the provincial government 
indicate continued concern about conflicts of interest within health 
professions regulators. A 2016 department guide on self-regulation, 
intended for use by “staff responsible for examining proposals for new 
or amended legislation respecting self-regulated professions” states that 
“[p]ersons with personal or professional conflicts of interest should be 
expressly prohibited from appointment as public representatives”90 who 
would sit on the Board alongside elected chiropractic professionals. This 
is consistent with a legislative intention that anyone carrying out duties 
within the College should not be in a position of conflict when carrying 
out those duties. 
The legislative scheme of the Chiropractic Act does not contain a 
definition of a conflict of interest. In the absence of any specific definition 
within the governing statute, the common law conceptions described earlier 
in this paper would apply to the decisions of anyone working within the 
College and would guide a determination of whether a particular situation 




With the exception of the Investigative Committee Chairs, it is unclear 
which College staff participated in investigating each complaint. 
However, many governing members of the College were implicated in the 
complaints, and the College made no mention of having enlisted outside, 
independent actors in the complaint-handling process. Registrants judging 
their own complaints would be a direct conflict of interest, one which 
the Chiropractic Act does not explicitly authorize, and which would run 
contrary to the Legislature’s interest in conflict avoidance. If no additional 
parties replaced the Board or Investigative Committee members in 
handling the complaints, this would effectively have left staff with two 
possibilities. One is that the staff whose websites were complained against 
could each recuse themselves from any individual complaint made against 
their website. This would leave members to potentially investigate and 
judge complaints about the same subject matter as their own reported 
or complained-against advertising. The other option is that all of the 
90. See Nova Scotia, Advisory Committee on Self-Regulation, “Self-Regulation in Nova Scotia: A 




complained-against or reported staff could all recuse themselves from 
investigating every complaint that was similar or related to their own case. 
This would potentially leave only a small minority of peers to investigate 
and judge all of the complaints. 
Based on the signatures visible on the complaint decisions, it 
appears that there were at least some individual complaint recusals. One 
Investigative Committee Chair was the signatory of all complaints except 
for the complaint against her own website.91 Her website’s complaint was 
instead signed by a second Investigative Committee Chair.92 However, 
both of the Investigative Committee Chairs were the signatories of 
complaint decisions involving the same subject matter as the complaint 
made against one of their websites, and the reports made against both of 
their websites. This indicates that the Chairs did not recuse themselves 
from all complaints related to their own website’s complaint or report. 
Based on this, it appears that the College, at least to some extent, chose 
the first recusal option, that of individual recusals, rather than the second 
option, that of collective recusals from all similar or related complaints.
This choice raises conflict of interest concerns, despite members 
apparently having recused themselves from investigating their own 
complaints directly. Individual recusals would result in members 
investigating whether statements about childhood conditions may constitute 
grounds for misconduct—despite the fact that their own advertising 
contained such statements. It could be argued that because not all of the 
advertising statements were identical, it may have been reasonable for 
members to judge one another’s cases, as long as they did not judge their 
own advertisement. However, all of the advertising had a common theme 
(childhood conditions), and the text across advertisements frequently 
contained much of the same vocabulary and phrasing and referenced many 
of the same ailments. Due to the similarities shared by the advertisements, 
a finding of misconduct against a fellow recused practitioner would most 
likely have the practical effect of setting a precedent for misconduct 
against the practitioner reviewing the complaint. Since misconduct 
can have implications on one’s professional reputation and ability to 
practice, any party potentially facing a misconduct investigation would 
presumably have a personal interest in the matter, particularly a financial 
one, as reputation and practicing status affect one’s financial viability as a 
91. See NSCC Complaint Decisions, supra note 63.
92. See NSCC, Cover	Letter	and	Decision	4.6.75 [unpublished].
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professional. Such an interest would likely give rise to a financial conflict 
resulting in a presumption of bias.93 
This interest is most clearly applicable to the Chair whose website was 
formally complained against, and who in turn investigated other formal 
complaints. However, it is also a concern with respect to the Investigative 
Committee Chair whose website was only informally reported. If the 
second Chair was judging complaints similar to their own report, then the 
fact that the second Chair had engaged in similar practices, coupled with 
the potential risk of being reported again for past or future advertising, 
could have a reputational impact on the second Chair if they were to find 
that the first Chair’s similar advertising constituted misconduct. In both 
cases, there would be a conflict grounded in the practitioners’ professional 
interest in their advertising practices.
(b)	 Oversight	conflicts	and	lack	of	recusals	
In addition to the issue of conflicts affecting members in complaint-
handling positions, there was also a more fundamental issue of conflicts 
affecting members in supervisory positions. The Board members and 
Board Chair were the parties who chose the members of their own 
Disciplinary Committees, which in turn handled the complaints. This 
means that even if all of the complained-against parties on the Committees 
had recused themselves from their investigative or adjudicative positions 
in all cases (including all complaints on the same subject matter as their 
own complaints), the Board still oversaw the process that the complaint-
handlers undertook, having also personally appointed these parties to 
undertake the process. The Board members and Chair having an oversight 
position with respect to these same complaints would create an additional 
conflict of interest in the complaint process, by way of these parties having 
a pecuniary interest in their own complained-against website content. As 
discussed previously, this is a recognized form of administrative conflict 
at common law. Since there was no evidence offered by the College that 
the Board members affected by the complaints were not involved in their 
ordinary function of overseeing the process, it appears that this conflict 
was in play when the complaints were handled.  
(c) Evidence handling issues 
When a complaint is received by a regulatory College, it is normally 
forwarded to the registrant to provide an opportunity to respond before the 
complaint is reviewed. Registrants made responses to the College in April, 
93. See Blake, supra note 29 at 121.
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a number of weeks before the College issued its decisions in June and 
July.94 In many cases, respondents removed material from their websites 
before the review, having been notified that the material might contravene 
College policy. That is, staff within the College had notified respondents 
about the online material before the Investigative Committee reviewed the 
material, apparently without anyone in the College taking any measures to 
retain the original material as evidence before it could be taken down. It is 
unclear which members of the College were responsible for these actions. 
However, the fact that a majority of governing members had connections 
to the complaints raises the possibility that the governing members’ 
involvement in the matter influenced the decision not to secure the online 
material prior to review, which in turn resulted in a determination that 
there was insufficient evidence for a finding of professional misconduct.  
Decisions to notify parties of a complaint against them, and of when 
and how to gather evidence within a complaint process, are administrative 
actions that appear to attract a significant duty of fairness, given their 
importance for professionals and their implications for the public. The 
fact that so many registrants who were affected by the complaints may 
potentially have been involved in these initial administrative actions 
raises the possibility of conflicts in these administrative decision-making 
processes. The particular concern in this situation is that registrants could 
notify other registrants about each complaint, including some of the 
direct evidence to be relied on (by way of the complaint forms requiring 
a description of all relevant information), in a situation in which many of 
the defendant registrants might have direct control over that evidence (by 
way of the ability to edit their own complained-against websites). This 
could have a bearing on availability of evidence to be considered, which 
could in turn have a significant impact on the outcome of the decision. 
An appearance of a conflict, or possibly an actual conflict, could have 
resulted from potential decision-makers in the complaint process having 
the ability to notify one another of the online evidence to be used against 
them, and then being given the time and ability to alter or destroy that 
evidence before it was reviewed. 
(d) Initial decline to forward concerns for investigation or to give 
reasons 
In the case of the informal reports, only one governing member of the 
College (the Registrar) had a formal ability to make a decision about 
whether to pursue the reports as complaints (one which would seem to 
94. See NSCC Decisions, supra note 63. 
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attract a high standard of procedural fairness). The Registrar was not 
named or otherwise connected to any of the informal reports and did not 
have any apparent connection to the matters involved. To this extent, there 
was no apparent dual role-based conflict of interest, as the Registrar would 
have only been in an administrative role, and not a defendant role, if the 
reports were pursued as complaints.
However, an indirect conflict could have arisen from the Registrar’s 
own administrative position relative to those of direct peers who were 
named in the reports. The Registrar, like other registrant Board members, 
is elected by a body of peers and may potentially serve for several terms 
at a time. If the Registrar (or any elected Board member) has an interest in 
maintaining their position (for example, for reasons related to professional 
reputation), this would potentially conflict with a decision to take regulatory 
action against other members of the Board, or against a large number of 
non-governing registrants of the College. Given that approximately 40% 
of province’s practitioners were named in the informal reports, a decision 
to take action on the reports could significantly undermine the probability 
of later re-election (and perhaps cause more general reputational damage 
in the eyes of one’s peers). This would constitute a personal interest, and 
potentially a financial one, as reputational stakes can impact one’s career. 
Both of these interests would also form the basis of an administrative 
conflict as described earlier. 
In addition to this, one party who was named in the informal reports 
was the current President of the College, and another party was a past 
President. Although the President is not part of the Board, the position 
of President is a highly senior position within the College. Seniority has 
been recognized as a source of bias where it may influence the regulatory 
decisions of peers within a self-regulating body, specifically where a senior 
professional has a known interest in the outcome of a regulatory decision. 
In a Manitoba Queen’s Bench case that resulted in this determination, bias 
was found by way of interested senior professionals who were part of the 
formal decision-making process, as well as by way of an interested senior 
professional who was not part of the decision-making committee but who 
later served as a complainant.95 The role of the College President as a 
potential defendant to one of the informal reports may be analogous to the 
role of the senior official who acted as a complainant: in both situations, a 
named senior professional’s potential interest in the case may put pressure 
or influence on a peer who is charged with making an independent decision 
about the case. This issue raises a potential concern about an appearance 
95. See Fong	v	Winnipeg	Regional	Health	Authority, 2004 MBQB 182  at para 17. 
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of biasing the Registrar, a party to whom the President may be considered 
senior in a professional context, despite the President serving in a separate 
branch of the College. 
3.	 Conclusions	on	conflicts	of	interest	in	self-regulation	complaint	
processes 
The overlapping roles and interests that were at play in the College’s 
complaint investigation decisions appear to have involved potential 
perceived or real conflicts involving the members who handled the 
advertising concerns. Given that conflicts of interest are a potential threat 
to the public interest—one that the Legislature appears to have been 
concerned with avoiding—the College’s decisions to allow for potential 
conflicts are unlikely to accord with the purpose of the legislation.  
In addition to the Legislature’s concern with conflict avoidance, 
there is a further reason why the Legislature could not have realistically 
intended for the College to interpret its powers in a way that would 
allow for conflicts to occur: such an interpretation would undermine the 
College’s own mandate. In health professions conflicts, one of the interests 
at the root of the conflict is the public interest, and the public interest is 
an express part of the statutory mandate of the regulator. Because of this, 
a conflicting interest that undermines the public interest would effectively 
frustrate the College’s ability to carry out its statutory mandate. It is a 
recognized principle of procedural fairness that an administrative decision-
maker “may not thwart the intention of the stature by failing to carry out 
the statutory mandate.”96 Interpreting the Chiropractic Act’s legislative 
scheme in a way that allows for the purpose of serving the public interest 
to be thwarted by conflicted interests would be an absurd result: if this 
approach were correct, then the legislation would allow for its own purpose 
to be defeated. The presumption against absurdity in accepted statutory 
interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the legislature could not 
have intended that the College should read its power in this way.97  
There are several alternative actions the College could have taken 
to address the advertising concerns in a way that would be more in line 
with its statutory purpose and its need to prevent and mitigate conflicts of 
interest. These options include requesting the assistance of an independent 
investigator, disclosing the possibility of conflicts among members in 
96. See Blake, supra note 29 at 111, citing Greenisle Environmental Inc v Prince Edward Island, 
[2005] 248 Nfld & PEIR 39, 2005 PESCTD 33 at para 42. 
97. See e.g. Ruth Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1994) at 88 (discussing the presumption against absurdity); see also Rizzo,	supra note 81 at para 27 
(endorsing Sullivan’s view on the presumption against absurdity). 
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advance of the advertising concerns being handled, and having any reported 
or complained-against College members step down from their complaint-
handling or oversight positions (whether temporarily or permanently).98 
The College of Chiropractors of British Columbia did all of these things 
when one of their Board and complaint inquiry members faced concerns 
over anti-vaccine content that he had posted online in 2018. The College’s 
response was to allow the member to resign from his College positions. The 
College then sought an independent investigator to look into the concerns, 
rather than having College members handle the concerns directly.99 This 
kind of response can allow a regulator to exercise its mandate, including its 
complaint and discipline functions, while distancing defendant members 
from having control over or involvement in the complaint process in a way 
that might create a conflict of interest. 
While the alternative courses of action available to the College may 
appear straightforward (in that another regulator was able to act on them 
in a recent case), the current lack of external guidance available to College 
members who may face conflicts of interest, combined with the number 
of overlapping roles and obligations among members, may make for an 
uphill battle for College members who may wish to organize alternative 
courses of action when potential conflicts arise. It should be acknowledged 
that in many cases, a governing member of a College who faces a conflict 
may be in a very difficult situation because of their position relative to 
other College members.  
An Investigative Committee Chair, for example, may understandably 
be reluctant to thoroughly investigate a Board Chair, given that the 
Board Chair is responsible for appointing and removing Committee 
Chairs.100 A Board member may be reluctant to take disciplinary action 
against a senior College member, such as a president, or against peer 
Board members, particularly if this would require a minority of Board 
members to take action against a majority of their peers. Any governing 
member may be wary of taking action on complaints that might implicate 
a large percentage of a province’s registrants, as this could undermine a 
governing member’s chances of re-election to the College. Permitting 
dual roles of practice and governance can put many actors in these 
challenging and conflicted positions, perhaps suddenly and unexpectedly. 
Without external guidance on how to handle these potential conflicts, this 
98. Chiropractic	 Act,	 supra note 21, s 42 (power to employ assistance in investigating any 
disciplinary matter).  
99. See Lindsay Health Claims, supra note 4.  
100. See Board	Regulations,	supra note 22, ss 7.1, 7.5. 
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situation may discourage investigatory and disciplinary actions, by pitting 
both professional interests and institutional hierarchy against the need 
to regulate professional conduct. If the possibility of seeing disciplinary 
action taken against registrants in favour of the public interest may also 
raise the possibility of damage to one’s professional, social, or institutional 
position, actors within the College will have less of a realistic chance of 
working in the public interest. 
The fact that College members may face challenging circumstances in 
addressing administrative conflicts of interest does not absolve the College 
of responsibility in properly carrying out its mandate. However, given 
the extent and potential prevalence and repeat nature of administrative 
conflicts within the regulator, further intervention from the Legislature in 
the form of more specific guidance could help to clarify to members that 
conflicts should be avoided, and also to outline which procedures College 
members should undertake to reduce conflicts. This clarification could 
take the form of specific guidance for regulators that may face conflict 
issues.  More fundamentally, clarification could be supported by way of 
reforms to the legislation itself. 
 Part III 
Health professions governance has been undergoing substantial change 
in many jurisdictions within the last several decades, with increasing 
layers of independent oversight being added into regulatory schemes. 
This section surveys recent and proposed regulatory reforms within health 
professions regulators, both outside and within Canada, and evaluates 
the extent to which these reforms may address conflicts of interest within 
health professions regulators. 
1. International examples of reforms to health professions regulation 
a.	 UK:	Repeal	of	self-regulation,	replacement	with	professional	
regulation  
The reforms undertaken in the United Kingdom with respect to the medical 
profession are probably the most radical reforms discussed in this section. 
The reform process began in the early 2000s, when a physician who was 
allowed to keep practising in the face of professional complaints went on to 
be found responsible for killing more than 200 patients. A national scandal 
ensued, with heavy public criticism that the medical profession’s regulator, 
the General Medical Council (GMC), had been overly self-interested and 
protective of practitioner interests in its operations. Following this, the 
GMC was significantly reformed. Two of the biggest changes to the GMC 
itself were altering the council’s membership to 50% lay membership, 
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rather than a professional majority, and having government-appointments 
of professional members, rather than peer-based elections.101 Additionally, 
a new independent body was created to oversee the GMC and other 
health professions regulators. This new body, the Professional Standards 
Authority for Health and Social Care (originally called the Council for 
the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals),102 has several main functions: 
reviewing regulators’ final disciplinary decisions, conducting performance 
reviews of regulators, and reviewing council appointment processes.103 
This system of oversight functions has effectively changed the UK model 
from a self-regulation model to a model of professional regulation by an 
external body. 
Although the initial reforms have now been in place for more than 15 
years, there is limited research evaluating their full effects. Allegations of 
the GMC catering to the interests of practitioners appear to have waned 
(potentially indicating a positive change), but some research has found 
potential negative effects of the new GMC reforms on practitioners 
themselves. In particular, there are claims that the GMC may now be 
overly punitive toward doctors.104 However, there are some indications that 
overall public trust in UK health professions and professional regulation is 
favourable,105 and the reforms do not appear to have had a negative impact 
on the regulatory system’s performance. The strategies of moving certain 
regulatory functions to an independent body, increasing lay membership 
in regulatory bodies, and making professional membership for regulators 
appointment-based, appear to be promising structural changes in terms of 
their potential for building the public interest into the regulatory system to 
a greater degree. These strategies may be particularly relevant in Canada 
because these ideas already have support from some Canadian health 
professionals, as will be discussed shortly. 
101. See General Medical Council, “Our History,” online: GMC	<www.gmc-uk.org/> [https://perma.
cc/YL23-KJM3].
102. See Patrick Butler, “National Body to Oversee Healthcare Professionals” (9 August 2001), 
online: The	Guardian	<www.theguardian.com/> [perma.cc/8PMF-BYZT].
103. See United Kingdom Professional Standards Authority, Our	 Work	 with	 Regulators,	 online: 
<www.professionalstandards.org.uk/> [perma.cc/T7WF-M6MS].
104. See United Kingdom, Civitas Doctor’s Policy Research Group, The	General	Medical	Council:	
Fit to Practise? (London: Civitas, 2014) (Hilarie Williams, Christoph Lees & Magnus Boyd), online 
(pdf): Civitas <www.civitas.org.uk/> [perma.cc/WT93-QFY6]. 
105. See UK, Nursing and Midwifery Council, Building	Trust	and	Confidence:	What	our	Audiences	
Say	about	 the	Key	 to	Better,	Safer	Care (London: NMC, 2019) at 4, online (pdf): <www.nmc.org.
uk/> [https://perma.cc/83FT-NV9F]; General Medical Council, Promoting	and	Maintaining	Public	





Australia’s approach to regulatory standard-setting is notable for its 
specificity. Australian health professions are regulated nationally, and 
in 2010, the National Registration and Accreditation Scheme came into 
force, effectively standardizing the manner in which health professions 
are regulated. The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency 
(AHPRA) was charged with working alongside each individual 
professional regulator (called a Board) to implement the standardized 
legislation. Importantly, AHPRA is independent from the regulators, and it 
has issued its own guidelines that the regulators are expected to follow. In 
some cases, the guidelines are highly specific, as in the case of AHPRA’s 
acceptable evidence guideline.106 
These guidelines are notable for their relative objectivity, as no single 
profession has control over their creation. This may potentially prevent 
professionals from crafting standards in their own interest. The guidelines 
are also highly specific and contain numerous concrete examples for 
acceptable and unacceptable conduct, which may help to prevent 
regulators from making arbitrary or self-interested decisions in cases 
where the guidelines would apply. The existence of independently created 
guidelines is not a be-all, end-all improvement to regulation, however. For 
example, although the acceptable evidence guideline targets the accuracy 
of advertising claims, research has found that inaccurate advertising is 
still common in Australia, and there have been calls for further reforms to 
the enforcement aspects of Australia’s regulatory framework to improve 
compliance.107
Despite these limitations, independently created guidelines for 
regulators can potentially be a useful tool in other jurisdictions, including 
Canada. To better ensure compliance, guidelines could be clearly labelled 
as formal standards (that is, labelling them as standards to denote that they 
are mandatory, rather than guidelines which may be treated as permissive). 
At least one Canadian regulator appears to agree with the approach of 
independently-created standards: the College of Chiropractors of British 
Columbia has directly adopted the AHPRA evidence guideline.108 Given 
that professions are regulated provincially and not nationally in Canada, 
106. See Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency, Factors for Assessing if Evidence is 
Acceptable (10 August 2019), online: AHRPA	<www.ahpra.gov.au/> [perma.cc/56TQ-T3V2].
107. See Ian Freckleton, “Misplaced Hope: Misleading Health Service Practitioner Representations 
and Consumer Protection” (2012) 20:1 J L & Med 7 at 7, online: ProQuest <search.proquest.com/> 
[perma.cc/MP4L-2WM7]. 
108. CCBC, “College of Chiropractors of British Columbia Professional Conduct Handbook” (30 
November 2017) at 50, online (pdf): CCBC <www.chirobc.com/> [perma.cc/J6R3-KAZ2].
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provincial arms-length regulatory bodies could be created to help set fair 
and specific professional standards for regulators to follow. 
2.	 Canada:	Themes	from	current	and	proposed	reforms		
a. Increased independent oversight of regulators 
i.	 Creation	of	a	separate	oversight	body,	changes	to	scope	of	powers	
Perhaps the most major recent proposals for regulatory reform in Canada 
are those that came out of British Columbia in late 2018. Following a 
great deal of public concern over the practices of the College of Dental 
Surgeons of British Columbia, which largely revolved around allegations 
of professional self-interest similar to those seen in the UK,109 the 
provincial government commissioned an inquiry led by UK-based 
regulation expert Harry Cayton. The final report from the inquiry, called 
the “Cayton Report,” contained sweeping recommendations for a new 
regulatory structure for health professionals. A primary recommendation 
was for the province to create an independent oversight body above all 
health professions, and to transfer certain functions from the Colleges to 
that independent body. The body would have similar functions to the UK’s 
independent regulator, taking on the tasks of disciplinary decision reviews, 
appointment oversight, College performance reviews, and investigations. 
However, the responsibilities of professional standards creation, licensing, 
and complaint investigation would remain with the Colleges.110 Health 
professionals, research experts, and members of the public have expressed 
support for more independent oversight in the form of a separate governing 
body, with the rationale being that the body could serve as a check against 
potential professional self-interest and reduce conflicts within health 
regulators.111 
ii. Separation of bodies and functions  
The Cayton Report noted that “Separation of investigation from 
adjudication is a common principle of law which currently does not apply 
under the [current Health Professions Act of British Columbia].”112 This 
109. See Bethany Lindsay, “How BC’s System for Regulating Health-care Workers is Failing 
Patients” (13 April 2019), online: CBC <www.cbc.ca/> [perma.cc/DNN5-RN53].
110. See Canada, The Professional Standards Authority for Health and Social Care, An Inquiry into 
the Performance of the College of Dental Surgeons of British Columbia and the Health Professions 
Act (London, UK: Professional Standards Authority, 2018) (Harry Cayton) at 91, online (pdf): 
Government of British Columbia <www2.gov.bc.ca/> [perma.cc/3Z5S-D36P].
111. See e.g. Paul Bendetti & Wayne MacPhail, “Calls Grow for Outside Regulation of Chiropractors” 
Globe	 and	 Mail (30 December 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/> [perma.cc/3N47-
ZANG].
112. See Cayton, supra note 110 at 87. 
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lack of separation was viewed as a factor in the creation of regulatory 
conflicts of interest. In his proposal to create an independent and separate 
professional oversight body, Cayton recommended that a new body should 
be responsible for complaint inquiries and disciplinary functions, as this 
would “create a proper independence from the licencing and investigatory 
functions of the colleges and remove conflicts of interest from the 
membership of the committees and panels.”113 
This step of separation between the investigation stage (largely 
conducted by the College) and the adjudication stage (conducted by a 
separate adjudication body) would make it impossible for the same party to 
have any immediate influence over both the investigation and adjudication 
of a complaint against them. One problem that may remain in such a system 
is defendants potentially influencing their own complaint investigations, if 
the power to investigate still remains with actively practising members of 
Colleges. However, moving both investigative and adjudicative functions 
to the new body would replicate the problem of a lack of separation. As a 
result, leaving the investigative power with the College may be justified 
based on this procedural concern, while still allowing for the benefit of 
adjudication through a more independent body. 
iii. Changing accountability structures  
Current structures of support and accountability in self-regulating bodies 
can create problematic incentives for members. In his study of self-
regulating bodies’ current roles, Robert Mysicka notes that “self-regulators 
derive a sizable portion of their support from current members and can be 
driven more by the immediate interests of such members instead of the 
broader interests of the public.”114 This support may be in part collegial, 
but it is also structural, in the form of member elections, a process in which 
all professionals can participate as voters.  
Many professionals themselves are concerned about regulatory 
conflicts of interest and support the idea of a change away from peer-based 
selection of governing members. For example, a 2018 survey conducted 
by the College of Chiropractors of Ontario found that a majority of the 
College’s own surveyed members felt that the College’s provisions did 
not address conflict of interest concerns sufficiently to allow the College 
to regulate in the public interest.115 A separate 2018 regulatory conference 
113. Ibid at 86-87. 
114. Robert Mysicka, “Who Watches the Watchmen? The Role of the Self-Regulator” (Toronto: CD 
Howe Institute, 2014) (CD Howe Institute Commentary 416) at 3, online: SSRN	<papers.ssrn.com/> 
[https://perma.cc/JBL8-EENE].
115. See College of Chiropractors of Ontario, “Conflict of Interest Considerations and Request for 
376	 The	Dalhousie	Law	Journal
survey found that 92% of surveyed attendees supported merit-based 
selection of regulators, instead of election-based selection.116 The College of 
Nurses of Ontario is taking direct action on this issue, with plans to change 
its governance structure to an appointment-based membership system 
that is focused around competencies, rather than peer-based elections.117 
An appointment-based structure for professional members would help to 
remove pressure from regulators to act in favour of their peers’ interests 
when professional and public interests conflict, as there would not be a 
risk of peer reprisal by way of removal from one’s regulatory post. 
In addition to considering professional membership in regulatory 
governance, public membership is also an important aspect of a regulator’s 
functions. Currently, many Canadian regulators require only a small 
minority of decision-makers to be non-professionals. Although there is 
a reasonable rationale that professional regulators are needed to evaluate 
complaints from an expert perspective, public members can bring an 
added degree of independence to the process. If too few investigators or 
adjudicators are non-professionals, their views can potentially be crowded 
out by a professional majority. As noted above, the UK’s reforms involved 
increasing lay representation on the GMC to 50% of the membership. In 
Canada, some regulators are now taking similar steps. The College of 
Dental Surgeons of British Columbia has increased its Board’s public 
membership through appointments by the province’s Minister of Health, 
and the College of Nurses of Ontario in Canada now intends to do the 
same with its own governance Board.118 This suggests that the use of more 
lay membership in governance to bolster independent decision-making 
holds at least some support and potential within Canada.  
b. Collaborative regulation 
Many professional activities can fall within the purview of multiple 
regulators. Practitioners who operate multidisciplinary clinics or engage 
in shared marketing, for example, may be responsible for adhering to 
clinic and marketing standards overseen by multiple regulatory Colleges, 
as well as competition law standards overseen by the Competition Bureau. 
This means that when issues arise from professional activities, there are 
Feedback” (29 October 2018) at 291, online (Council Public Package): CCO <www.cco.on.ca/>.
116. See Julie Maciura, “92%” (October 2018), online (newsletter): SML	Law <www.sml-law.com/> 
[perma.cc/6C4S-39YD].
117. See College of Nurses of Ontario, “Governance Vision 2020,” online: CNO <www.cno.org/> 
[perma.cc/ZRE5-JC5Y].
118. Ibid; British Columbia Ministry of Health, News Release, “Board Appointments Help Dental 




sometimes multiple regulators that may take action, whether separately 
or in collaboration with one another. Encouraging input from multiple 
regulators, where possible, may reduce the likelihood of self-regulating 
bodies encountering conflicts of interest in their activities. 
Collaboration could occur between regulatory Colleges and 
independent bodies like the Competition Bureau or other consumer 
protection bodies. Given that many of the same professional activities 
might fall within the oversight of self-regulators and the Competition 
Bureau, Mysicka proposes that “Canadian governments can further 
enhance oversight by consulting with the Competition Bureau and 
consumer advocacy groups when administering or surveying self-
regulatory powers.”119 Increased input from bodies like the Bureau 
may help to put greater emphasis on consumer protection, rather than 
professional interests, when governments are reviewing self-regulatory 
powers or when self-regulatory bodies are creating their own policies or 
reviewing enforcement practices.120 
Collaboration could also occur between different health professions’ 
regulatory Colleges. Two provinces, Nova Scotia and Ontario, have 
already created legislation to support collaborative regulation among 
health professions, and in general there has been an increased interest 
in collaborative health professions regulation in Canada.121 Current 
legislation in Nova Scotia allows for several actions that may help to 
avoid conflicts in complaint processes, such as the ability for different 
health professions to investigate on one another’s behalf, and the ability 
for professions to assign investigative tasks to appointed investigative 
professionals (rather than the elected professionals of a College).122 
Professional Colleges can also develop collaborative policies, tools and 
resources, and communicate with government and other bodies regarding 
improvements to regulation,123 which could help with developing policies 
and practices that prevent investigative or disciplinary conflicts. 
Nova Scotia’s legislation is permissive in nature; professions are not 
required to collaborate but may do so voluntarily.124 While this legislation 
may work well for enabling professional autonomy and initiatives, it may 
be justifiable to treat the prevention of conflicts as an exceptional situation 
119. Mysicka, supra note 114 at 4.  
120. Ibid at 20-21.
121. See William Lahey & Katherine Fierlbeck, “Legislating Collaborative Self-regulation in Canada: 
A Comparative Policy Analysis” (2016) 30:2 J Interprof Care 211.
122. Regulated	Health	Professions	Network	Act, SNS 2012, c 48, ss 19(5)(a), (e).
123. Ibid, ss 16(3)(b), (f).
124. See Lahey & Fierlbeck, supra note 121.
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in which collaboration should be made mandatory by government, as the 
public interest arguably outweighs an interest in professional autonomy. 
For similar reasons, other Canadian jurisdictions without collaborative 
legislation could benefit from creating rules that would require health 
professions to collaborate in ways that help to reduce regulatory conflicts 
of interest.
3. Conclusion on proposals for reform  
Taken together, the proposals and reforms made to health professions self-
regulators within and outside Canada would represent a significant overhaul 
of the current system. Changes like creating independent oversight and 
rule-making bodies, increasing the separation of regulatory functions, 
altering College membership composition, and using new processes for 
determining who can govern a College all represent a different way of 
approaching almost every facet of the current system. Some of these 
changes, like changing governance composition, may be simpler to effect 
than other changes, like creating entirely new bodies. Each change has 
its own set of potential limitations, and little is known about whether one 
approach may be the most effective.  
However, most of the outlined proposals have been implemented 
somewhere, and most have been endorsed by at least some regulators or 
their professional members within Canada, without any indication of the 
changes being a misstep. More fundamentally, any one of these changes 
would decrease the propensity for governing members of Colleges to be 
in conflicted positions that may lead to decisions that are harmful to the 
public. The more duties, roles, and expectations a professional carries 
within the same system, the more likely it is that some of these interests 
will conflict. Any change that decreases the number of overlapping 
regulatory and professional roles and expectations for health professionals 
can help to solve this problem. Regulatory reform for Canadian health 
professions is already receiving attention for a variety of reasons, in the 
hope of addressing a variety of concerns related to public health, safety, 
and trust. Conflicts of interest within self-regulating governance structures 
should be included on the list of important considerations that can be 
readily targeted by reform. 
